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Summary of Discussed Paper Being charged with a crime often results in social
stigma even if the defendant has been cleared of the charges. For instance, an employer
may anticipate that a criminal's expected productivity is lower than an average person's,
or a landlord may anticipate problems when letting a house to a criminal. Since the
proportion of criminals even among acquitted defendants is larger than that among the
general population, defendants will earn lower wages and pay higher rent even after
acquittal.
In a recent paper, Daughety and Reinganum (2014) show that the Scottish Verdict, in
which juries can, based on the strength of the evidence, acquit defendants either as 'not
guilty' or as 'not proven', delivers a more precise signal to society on the defendant's true
guilt than the standard rule, and thus implies that truly innocent defendants are less likely
to be stigmatised. Based on this result, Daughety and Reinganum (2016, henceforth DR)
analyse two dierent ways of implementing the Scottish verdict within the U.S. criminal
justice system, one in which defendants can decide between being adjudicated under
the standard rule and under the Scottish verdict, and another one in which juries may
award compensation to acquitted defendants if the evidence against them is particularly
weak (selective compensation). They nd that, although only innocent defendants are
better o under the Scottish verdict, even guilty defendants would opt for it in order
to imitate the innocents. Furthermore, selective compensation permits less accurate
informal punishment than the Scottish verdict (unless prosecutors are not held responsible
for compensation) but might be better implementable in practice.
In the following, I will discuss three ways of extending DR's analysis: allowing for
risk-averse defendants, considering the social cost of informal punishment even of truly
guilty defendants, and the protection of a defendant's privacy as an alternative means of
avoiding informal punishment of truly innocent defendants.
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Risk Aversion A practical implication of DR's results is that, if the legal system does
not allow for imposing the Scottish verdict on defendants, allowing them to decide over
its application is equivalent, since risk-neutral, truly innocent defendants strictly prefer
the Scottish verdict over the standard rule. Hence, a defendant who decides against
the Scottish verdict can be inferred to be truly guilty. However, while a truly innocent
defendant's expected payo is higher under the Scottish verdict, so is its variance, since
even a truly innocent acquitted defendant may end up being labeled not proven and
getting a higher informal punishment than under the standard rule. Hence, a risk-averse
innocent defendant may still prefer the standard rule, thus rendering a choice of the
standard rule a worthwhile option for guilty defendants. As a consequence, the standard
rule would be used excessively under such a regime, making the alternative regime of
selective compensation a potentially more attractive legislative option.
Social Cost of Stigmatising Truly Guilty Defendants Whereas DR evaluate legal
scenarios based on the accuracy of the imposed informal sanctions, an interesting avenue
for future research is to explicitly analyse the eects of these legal scenarios on social wel-
fare. Recall that the main motivation for DR's paper is to reduce informal punishment
of truly innocent defendants, which is reected by DR's use of the misclassication loss
to evaluate legal scenarios. However, there may also be substantial welfare loss associ-
ated with stigmatising truly guilty defendants, as Funk (2004) and Mungan (2014) have
stressed: For instance, if their benet from legal activities falls due to stigma, they are
more likely to recidivate. Taking the social costs of this consequence of social stigma into
account may yield quite dierent policy conclusions.
To illustrate this point, consider an extension of the model in which there is a proba-
bility  that a truly guilty defendant commits another crime, which depends on the wage
that the defendant earns after acquittal, and let the social welfare loss caused by this
crime be L. In accordance with the literature on stigmatisation of criminals1 and DR's
assumption that informal punishment is proportional to the outside observer's belief that
the defendant is truly guilty, let ((G j y)) be an increasing function of these beliefs for
every jury decision y. Suppose furthermore that the defendant has been acquitted, and
let hng be the probability of a not-guilty verdict under the Scottish rule conditional on
being acquitted. Then the expected social loss due to subsequent crimes committed by
an acquitted defendant under the Scottish verdict is
S = [hng(G j ng)((G j ng)) + (1  hng)(G j np)((G j np))]L: (1)
1Rasmusen (1996) and Mungan (2014) show that wages in a competitive labour market will be
increasing in the employers' beliefs about whether the employee is a criminal.
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Note that hng, (G j ng) and (G j np) are increasing in ng. Furthermore, (A.2b)
and (A.2c) in DR imply that, as ng approaches g (or 0, respectively), the situation
converges to the standard rule, in which case (G j ng) (or (G j np), respectively)
approaches (G j a) and hng approaches 1 (or 0, respectively). If the jury is instructed to
choose the evidence threshold ng so as to minimize S, then, depending on the functional
form of (:), it may well be the case that this will be achieved by choosing ng = g (or,
equivalently, ng = 0), i.e., by the standard rule.
Intuitively, my assumption that only truly guilty defendants would commit a crime
again implies that the crime rate only depends on the informal punishment of truly
guilty defendants. DR's analysis implies that truly guilty defendants under either way of
implementing the Scottish verdict are worse o than under the standard rule. Hence, if
(:) is at least not too concave, social costs from repeat oending are minimized under
the standard rule.
Of course, a full welfare analysis would also require taking into account social benets
of employers being able to observe more accurately whether their potential employees
are truly innocent or guilty, such as, for instance, incentives for truly innocent people
to invest in human capital. Furthermore, much of the above analysis was driven by the
assumption that truly innocent defenders would not become criminals even after being
socially stigmatised. Hence, a useful task for future research is to derive hypotheses
regarding the areas of law in which these assumptions that favour the standard rule are
more or less likely to hold.
Privacy Law A nal suggestion of how to extend DR's analysis is to consider other
ways of reducing the social cost of stigmatising innocent defendants. For instance, many
countries have introduced strong privacy laws that protect personal details of most ac-
quitted defendants.2 In Germany, even some of the convicted defendants are protected
by this law, since only convictions above a certain threshold of the formal sanction are
included in the criminal record. This kind of anecdotal evidence is in line with the theo-
retical results in this area such as that of Mungan (2014), who argues that convicts guilty
of low-harm (high-harm) crimes should always (never) be protected from social stigma,
whereas convicts guilty of crimes with intermediate levels of harm should be given the
opportunity of expunging at a cost. Given these dierences across countries and the
aforementioned disadvantages of making informal sanctions more ecient, an interesting
research question would be to derive testable hypotheses as to whether privacy law or the
Scottish verdict is socially preferable, and how this comparison depends on a country's
2The few exceptions in which the identity of a defendant becomes publicly known already during the
trial in these countries typically involve defendants or crimes of extraordinary public interest.
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legal environment.
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